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the correction being 26 U.2d 190, 487 P.2d 849 (1971).

Said

case is cited on pages 9 and 12 of Appellant's Brief.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE MOUNTAIN STATES
TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH
COMPANY,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellant,
Case No. 16000
VS.

SALT LAKE CITY,
Respondent.

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a suit challenging the constitutionality and
legality of those taxes which Salt Lake City imposes on the
gross revenue derived from that part of Plaintiff's telephone
business which is conducted within Salt Lake City.

Plaintiff

claims that other businesses are permitted to compete with
Plaintiff within Salt Lake City without paying the same taxes
required of Plaintiff.

Plaintiff also claims that the most

recent increase in the challenged taxes operates as an impermissible utility rate increase.
II.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The Law and Motion Division of the Third Judicial
District Court, Honorable David K. Winder, granted Defendant
Salt Lake City's motion for summary judgment and dismissed
Plaintiff's complaint.
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III.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant asks this Court to reverse the judgment of
the District Court and to remand the case for trial.
IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

By its ordinance set out in Bill No. 110 of 1977,
published July 1, 1977 (R. 172), Salt Lake City increased the
utility revenue tax it imposes on that part of Plaintiff's
business which is conducted within Salt Lake City to a total
of eight percent, including the two percent component of the
total revenue tax which has historically been known as the
franchise fee.
During the period when the bill amending this section
of the ordinance was being considered by the city's Board of
Commissioners, various discussions and written communications
took place between Plaintiff and Defendant with respect to the
question of what competition Plaintiff was experiencing in the
Salt Lake City market for telephone equipment.

A summary of

the information which Plaintiff provided Defendant with respect
to this question is contained in that letter dated June 29, 1977,
which, together with its attachments, appears as Exhibit "1" to
that affidavit of Kenneth R. Madsen dated June 22, 1978 (R. 269296).

That letter informed Defendant of the existence of six

companies active in the Salt Lake market whose principal business
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consists of or includes direct competition with Plaintiff and
who provide telephone terminal equipment on terms and conditions virtually identical to those of the Plaintiff telephone
company (R. 272, 279-284).

Defendant was also provided with

the identities of some of Plaintiff's major accounts which had
been lost to these companies during the prior year (R. 279-284).
Defendant was further informed of the existence of an extensive
number of retail outlets which were selling telephone equipment
in competition with Plaintiff, but whose sales would not be
subject to the eight percent tax which is challenged in this
suit (R. 272-78).
On July 26, 1977, Defendant passed an ordinance purporting to impose a six percent tax on businesses in competition
with Plaintiff.

Section 20-3-14.1 Revised Ordinances of Salt

Lake City, Utah, 1965 (R. 14; para. 10).

The pleadings reflect

a dispute as to whether Defendant has ever collected any tax
from Plaintiff's competitors pursuant to this provision.

Plain-

tiff's complaint alleges that no such tax has been collected
(R. 6; para. 20).

Defendant's answer denies this allegation

(R. 14, para. 11), but Defendant has not presented by affidavit
any evidence that it has collected this tax.
As part of the information received by Defendant with
respect to this tax, Defendant was informed by the Washington,
D. C. counsel for four of Plaintiff's competitors that these
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four companies had sold $270,000 worth of telephone equipment
in Salt Lake City during 1976, and that these companies estimated that this sum represented 43% of the telephone equipment
of this type sold in Salt Lake City during 1976 (R. 297-99).
Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that it is required
by orders issued by the Utah Public Service Commission to collect
taxes of the type at issue in this suit from those customers
who use its services within the limits of Salt Lake City; and
that under the facts of this case, the challenged amendment
operated as a utility rate increase (R. 4, para. 11).

Defendant

denied, for lack of information and belief, the allegation that
Plaintiff has

c0~olied

with the applicable orders of the Public

Service Commission (R. 13, para. 5), and denied that the
challenged tax increase operated as a utility rate increase.
Defendant moved for SQmmary judgment on several
grounds.

The District Court granted Defendant's motion, stat-

ing in its memorandum decision only that:
"It is the opinion of the Court that the franchise fee and the utility revenue tax in question
in this case, and which have been imposed by the
defendant upon the plaintiff are valid and constitutional and have not been disproportionately
(as compared with other businesses similarly
situated) taxed upon the plaintiff and so as
to be violative of either the Constitution of
Utah or the United States Constitution."
(R. 447).
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V.
I.

ARGUMENT

THE COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS
THAT IT HAS COMPETITORS WHO ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PAY THE TAX
AT ISSUE RAISE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
l.

The Allegations and their Evidentiary Support.
The District Court was presented with an undisputed

factual showing that a drastic change had occurred with respect
to the extent to which Plaintiff is required to compete with
other companies in the sale or lease of telephone equipment.
In 1974, the Federal Communications Commission, in that series
of cases which have come to be known in the telecommunications
industry as "The Interconnect Cases," issued an order which had
the effect of initiating nationwide competition in the sale of
telephone
Leasing

equipme~t.

Co~.,

This order, In the Matter of Telerant

45 F.C.C. 2d 204 (1974) was presented to the

District Court by affidavit and is part of the Record on Appeal
(R. 327-49).
An explanation of the background of this decision
is necessary to show its impact on the case before this Court.
In Carterfone v. AT&T, 13 F.C.C. 2d 420 (1968), the F.C.C.
ruled that federal tariffs governing the conduct of telephone
utility companies could not prohibit the connection of telephones
and switchboards manufactured by other companies to telephone
networks used in interstate commerce.

The Carterfone decision,

did not, however, prescribe any specific interconnection policy
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for telephone utilities.

The utilities responded to the Carter-

fane decision by filing tariffs which permitted connection to
the interstate telephone system of telephones and switchboards
manufactured by independent manufacturers so long as the installation included certain specified electronic protective
devices which had to be provided by the utility companies.
In the early 1970's, some state utility commissions
gave notice that they planned to issue tariffs prohibiting interconnection of telephones and switchboards manufactured by
sources other than the utility companies to any telephone exchange except where the telephones and switchboards were used
exclusively for ::.:1terstate communication.

In the 1974 Telerant

decision, the Federal Communications Commission issued an order
declaring that state regulatory commissions had no power to
issue tariffs which were more restrictive with respect to interconnection than the then applicable F.C.C. tariffs unless it
could be shown that such state tariffs would apply solely to
communications within that state.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed

the F.C.C. 's Telerant ruling in the 1974 case of North Carolina
Utilities Commission v. F.C.C.

(hereinafter referred to as

North Carolina I), 537 F.2d 787 (Fourth Cir. 1976), Cert. denied,
97 S. C.T. 651 (1976).
The Carterfone an9 Telerant rulings were further
broadened by the F.C.C. inits case, Docket No. 19528, which was
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also affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in North Carolina Utilities
Commission v. F.C.C.

(hereinafter referred to as North Carolina

II), 552 F.2d 1026 (Fourth Cir. 1976).

In that case, the F.C.C.

ruled that telephone company tariffs governing interstate communication would be required to allow connection to the telephone
lines of any terminal equipment which had been registered with
the F.C.C. in accordance with a registration program established
by the Docket 19528 Order.

The effect of this ruling was to

permit the attachment of any registered terminal equipment to
the national telephone network without being forced to use
intermediate electronic protective devices supplied by telephone
utility companies.

The history of the interconnect cases and

the significance of their impact on the telecommunications
industry is set forth in the Fourth Circuit ruling in the
North Carolina II case, a copy of which was presented to the
District Court by affidavit and which appears as Pages 301-326
of the Record on Appeal in this matter.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in the North Carolina II
case points out that the net legal effect of the interconnect
cases was to deprive telephone utility companies of the "private
lawmaking authority" they had previously enjoyed over independent manufacturers of telephone equipment.
1051.

552 F.2d 1035 at

The practical effect of the interconnect cases was to

stimulate companies other than telephone utility companies to
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start manufacturing and selling telephone equipment.

The

success of some of these companies is dramatically illustrated
by the letter from their counsel to Defendant, which appears at
Pages 298-300 of the Record on Appeal.

This letter indicates

that by 1976, four of these companies had captured what they
were willing to estimate was 43% of the market for telephone
equipment in Salt Lake City.

These companies further repre-

sented to Defendant that they had collectively sold some
$270,000 worth of telephone equipment within Salt Lake City in
that year.

The letter and attachments at Pages 272-278 of the

Record shows

tru~

by June of 1977, more than 50 retail outlets,

including most of the major department stores in Salt Lake,
were selling telephone equipment in direct competition with
Plaintiff.

Salt Lake City

~as

given all these businesses a

competitive advantage over Plaintiff by requiring Plaintiff to
add 8% to the cost of the telephone equipment it sells or
leases, while not requiring that other businesses pay the same
tax on the telephone equipment which they sell or lease.
2.

The Materiality of the Allegations.
The facts set out above were presented to the District

Court by affidavit, and were not disputed by Defendant.

Al-

though the Court did not discuss how it had dealt with these
facts in reaching its decis_ion on Defendant's Motion for Surrnnary
Judgment, the most reasonable inference appears to be that the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Court must have accepted the argument presented by Defendant in
its memorandum in support of its motion to the effect that the
holding of this Court in the case of Mountain States Telephone

& Telegraph Company v. Ogden City, 26 U.2d 487 P.2d 849 (1971),
stands for the proposition that Defendant has no legal obligation, regardless of what level of economic competition Plaintiff
may be experiencing, other than to tax Plaintiff at the same
rate at which it taxes the other two utility companies which
operate within the city.

The Ogden City case, however, was

decided before the Federal Communication Commission's ruling in
the Telerant case discussed above, and at a time when Plaintiff
was not experiencing competition in the sale of telephone equipment as alleged and adduced by affidavit in this matter.
The existence of this competition brings the facts of
this case within the holding of this Court's decision in Salt
Lake City v. Utah Light
(1914).

& Railway Co., 45 U.SO, 142 P. 1067

In that case, Salt Lake City passed an ordinance which

prohibited engaging in the business of furnishing, distributing
or selling electricity, where meters were used to gauge or
measure the electricity, without procuring a license from the
city so to do.

The ordinance further provided for an annual

license fee of $1.00 for each electric meter used by the
license holder.

The opinion shows that although plaintiff was

the only electric company which used meters to measure the
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electricity which it sold to its customers, there were at the
time other companies engaged in selling electricity within Salt
Lake City.

The plaintiff electric company alleged that Salt

Lake City's ordinance was invalid because it excluded from
taxation various companies which were in fact competing with
plaintiff in the sale of electricity within Salt Lake City.
The opinion notes that then, as now, all of Salt
Lake City's power to tax businesses operating within its limits
was conferred on the city by a statute which includes the
limitation that "all such license fees and taxes shall be uniform in respecc
142 P. at 1070.

~~

the class upon which they are imposed."

This language is identical with the present

language of §10-8-80, Utah Code Annotated.
In the Utah Light

& Railway case, Salt Lake City

argued that the Court needed only to determine that plaintiff
was the only utility which used meters to measure the electricity
it delivered to its customers from which the conclusion would
follow that it could be taxed in a separate category.

This

Court rejected that method of analysis and examined the economic significance of the facts shown in the Record to determine
whether plaintiff and the companies which were not subject to
the ordinance were similarly situated.

The Court then set out

in these words the test which is to be applied in testing the

-10-
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validity of a city's business revenue ordinances:
"Can the business specified in the ordinance be
so classified that some of those who are engaged
therein may be required to pay the tax, while
others who are conducting the same business are
not required to do so? Clearly not." 142 P. at
1071.
The opinion then explains in greater detail the reasoning upon which this test is based:
"A license tax might not be unjust, though
laid upon a single occupation, provided that it
was so laid that none who followed that occupation escaped it.
Let it reach all of a class,
either of persons or things; it matters not
whether those included in it may be one or
many, or whether they reside in any particular
locality or are scattered all over the state.
But when, for any reason, it becomes discriminative between individuals of the class taxed,
and selects some for an exce tional burden, the
tax is eprived o the necessary e ement o
legal equality, and becomes inadmissible."
(Emphasis added.)
142 P. at 1071.
It is significant that the foregoing language is
inconsistent with the fundamental premise upon which Defendant's
argument is based.

In concluding its argument to the District

on this issue, Defendant stated in its memorandum of points
and authorities:
"It is respectfully submitted that the issue of
classification has already been decided by the
Utah Supreme Court; however, in any event, the
case law is abundant and not subject to challenge
at this date and the classification of the
Plaintiff and the other utilities is lawful in
all particulars and within the legislative
prerogative of Salt Lake City Corporation."
(R. 430).
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Although this language is somewhat unclear, it seems, when read
in the light of those issues raised by Plaintiff's complaint,
to mean that Defendant contends that this Court's 1971 Ogden
Ci~

case, supra, means that Plaintiff can never challenge

any inequities in those taxes imposed on it by Salt Lake City
unless such inequities should happen to exist between Plaintiff
and the two other major utility companies.

An adjudication

that a tax is valid is not as static and permanent as Defendant
apparently contends.
Light

The language quoted above from the Utah

& Railwav case shows that taxing authorities, such as

Salt Lake City, are subject to the restriction that their taxes,
even if once

reasonat~e,

may become discriminatory.

When such

discrimination occurs, the tax is stripped of whatever legality
it may previously have enjoyed, and becomes unlawful and void.
This Court then concluded its opinion by commenting on the
duty of courts when they are presented with facts showing that
some of those who are engaged in a business are required to
pay the tax, while others who are conducting the same business
are not so taxed:
"Equality, therefore, becomes a safeguard against,
if not an absolute prevention of, excessive and
oppressive taxation.
Where, however, those who,
for the time being, are intrusted with the power
to pass laws or ordinances by which taxation may
be imposed invade the rule of equality prescribed
by the paramount law, it is the duty of the courts,
when proper application is made, to declare such
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law or ordinance void, and thus arrest the evil
at its inception.
In doing so the courts are
not, as it is sometimes popularly assumed, interfering with the law-making power, but are
merely compelling that power to observe and obey
the paramount law.
For the reasons last stated,
we are required to declare the ordinance in
question invalid."
(142 P. at 1071-72.)
It is this duty which Plaintiff contends the District
Court failed to adequately perform.

The District Court's duty

to diligently safeguard the rule of equality referred to in
the foregoing quotation from the Utah Light

& Railway

case is

augmented in this case by the fact that the question of equality
of taxation was raised by means of a motion for summary judgment.

Because summary judgment has the effect of denying the

complaining party the right to try its claims, the District
Court in ruling on such a motion should carefully scrutinize
the allegations of the complaint and all facts submitted by
the

complainin~

fact.

party to discern the existence of any disputed

In the event any disputed issue of material fact is

presented, the summary judgment motion should be denied.

Rich

v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976); Singleton v. Alexander,
19 U.2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967).
Those facts adduced by Plaintiff which show the
existence of at least fifty retail outlets in direct competition
with Plaintiff in the sale of telephone equipment within Salt
Lake City bring this case within the holding of this Court in
the case of Orem City v. Pyne, 16 U.2d 355, 401 P.2d 181 (1965).
In that case, this Court incorporated as its opinion the opinion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-13Machine-generated
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of Judge Maurice Harding in case No. 4039, District Court of
Utah County, State of Utah, which opinion appears at Pages
263-66 of the Record on Appeal.

In that case, the City had

passed an ordinance which set a fixed annual tax rate for a
number of businesses listed by type in the ordinance.

Another

section of the same ordinance imposed a tax, based on gross
sales, on any business not specifically listed in other sections of the ordinance.

This Court held that the taxation

imposed under that ordinance was unconstitutional because the
ordinance had the effect of taxing one business which sold
tangible personal property at a rate which was in some cases
as much as twe l

\'E

times the arno-un t of tax required of other

businesses also selling tangible personal property.

In this

case, the facts alleged in Plaintiff's complaint, and put before
the District Court by affid-vit, show the existence of many
retail sellers of tangible personal property which do not pay
the eight percent tax which plaintiff is required to pay when
it sells or leases the exact same item of telephone equipment.
In Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 U. 476, 206 P.2d
153 (1949), a case in which one of Salt Lake City's ordinances
was held unconstitutional for failing to regulate uniformly
different businesses competing in the same type of sales, this
Court commented on the judiciary's function when presented
with the allegation that a municipal ordinance subjects the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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complaining party to an unconstitutional tax burden:
"[The Court's function] is to determine whether
an enactment operates equally upon all persons
similarly situated.
If it does then the discrimination is within permissible legislative
limits.
If it does not, then the differentiation would be without reasonable basis and the
act does not meet the test of constitutionality."
206 P.2d 153 at 160.
In this case, Plaintiff had alleged and put before the District
Court by affidavit facts showing that although Defendant Salt
Lake City had been fully informed of the fact that Plaintiff was
experiencing highly successful competition from other companies
which had recently been permitted to enter the market for
telephone equipment.

Salt Lake City elected to tax only Plain-

tiff while failing or refusing to insure the Plaintiff's
similarly situated competitors also paid taxes on some uniform
basis.

Plaintiff contends that the District Court erred in not

recognizing that these facts were sufficient to raise a disputed
question of material fact regarding the extent to which the
legal and economic changes explained in the preceding sections
of this brief required Salt Lake City to tax Plaintiff's competition uniformly in comparison with the taxes it required of
Plaintiff. The failure of the District Court to recognize the
need for equal taxation under these circumstances seems particularly obdurate in light of the fact that the pleadings show
that Salt Lake City had apparently recognized the existence of
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this obligation by enacting §20-3-14.1 of its ordinances which
purported to tax Plaintiff's competition.
II.

THE COURT ERRED IN APPARENTLY RULING THAT THERE EXISTS
NO SET OF FACTS UNDER WHICH DEFENDANT'S TAX INCREASE
COULD OPERATE AS A UTILITY RATE INCREASE.
It is less than clear that the District Court ruled

on this issue, although the Court's statement that it finds
the taxes in question to be valid and constitutional (R.447)
seems to include, by necessary implication, some ruling on this
issue.

That such a ruling was apparently

~ade,

in turn

necessarily implies that the District Court must have concluded
that there was no way that a municipal ordinance could be
legally tantamount to a utility rate increase.

Plaintiff's

complaint alleges that the increase imposed by the 1977 amendment operates as a utility rate increase (R. 4).

The material-

ity of this allegation does not seem to be disputed by Defendant,
for it conceded in its argument to the District Court that
the power to set utility rates is vested solely in the Utah
Public Service Commission.

Plaintiff and Defendant apparently

also agree that the Public Service Commission's power, delegated by the legislature under Section 54-7-1 et seq.,

Utah

Code Annotated, to set utility rates is a separate power from
that conveyed to the City under Section 10-8-80 permitting it
to tax for revenue purposes~

(R. 434).
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Plaintiff's disagreement with Defendant with respect
to this issue centers on the question of whether the two powers
have been kept separate under the facts of this case.

Defendant

has presented, by its affidavits, no facts bearing on this
question; and its argument on this issue is restricted to the
conclusory assertion, by memorandum of counsel, that the City
has not improperly set rate structures.

Defendant has, accord-

ingly, failed to traverse the allegation of Plaintiff's complaint
to the effect that, given the pass through nature of the tax
increase, the tax increase constitutes an impermissible utility
tax increase.
The case law authority bearing on the question of
what constitutes an impermissible utility rate increase uniformly supports the position of Plaintiff on this issue.

The

case law on this issue has defined setting a utility rate as
the taking of some action which determines what rate will be
charged in the future for utility services.

In states such

as Utah where the legislature has delegated the rate setting
function to the Public Service Commission, any governmental
agency which takes an action having the effect of requiring a
new rate to be paid for utility service has unconstitutionally
transgressed the limits of its power.

This point can perhaps be

best illustrated by examining those limitations which courts
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have imposed on themselves in cases dealing with utility rate
structures.

Courts can determine whether existing rates are too

high or too low, but they cannot prescribe what rate will be
permissible in the future.

Were a court to purport to include

such a provision in its order with respect to utility rates, the
court would commit error by usurping a function of the legislative branch of government.

Southwestern Bell Telephone Com-

pany v. State of Texas, 526 S.W.2d 526 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1975);
Mississippi Public Service Commission v. Horne Telephone Company,

110 S.2d 618.

Similarly, a complaint challenging the phone

company's practice of

~iving

free service to its employees was

dismissed because the relief sought would, by necessary implication, have required a rate adjustment.

The Court noted that

this relief could only be obtained from the State Public Service
Commission; and held that it did not, therefore, have jurisdiction.

Dworkin v. Illinois Bell, 340 N.E.2d 98 (Ill. App. 1975).
The imposition by Salt Lake City of the utility revenue

tax at issue falls within the definition of imposing a utility
rate increase.

The City has determined that a change in rates

will be required, the City has determined when the change will
be effective, and the City has prescribed what the amount of
the change will be.

The City conceded in its argument to the

District Court (R. 435-36) that it passed the revenue ordinance
in question relying on the assumption that the tax thus imposed
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would be passed through to Salt Lake City users of phone service
in the form of rate increases.
ment entity, does those

When the City, acting as a govern-

things, the City, no less than a court,

exceeds the constitutional limits of its power and encroaches
on the powers delegated to the Public Service Commission by the
state legislature.
As was the case with respect to Plaintiff's allegations of discriminatory taxation, the District Court should have
recognized the existence of disputed fact questions raised by
Plaintiff's allegations with respect to the effect upon utility
rates of Defendant's tax increase.

This increase was only one

of a series of such increases by Defendant, and appears to have
been effected with the express intention of passing the tax
through to users of telephone service within Salt Lake City.
In order to rule as it did, the District Court must necessarily
have ruled without trial that Plaintiff's evidence could never
result in the conclusion that the City's actions, apparently
carried out with the intention of causing an increase in utility
rates within Salt Lake City, were the equivalent of a utility
rate increase.

The standard of review which has been set by

this Court precluded the District Court, however, from declaring
this sort of prejudgment on the merits of Plaintiff's evidence.
Singleton v. Alexander, 19 U.2d at 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967).
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The real world in which Plaintiff must conduct its
business has changed substantially since Plaintiff last challenged its taxation by Salt Lake City.

That change was imposed

by federal regulations and orders, affirmed by federal courts.
As a result, Plaintiff now has a great deal of competition in
areas where it has not had competition during most of this
century.

Defendant was fully informed of the existence of

this competition, but to this date has chosen to tax Plaintiff
as it has traditionally done, with the result that Salt Lake
City is imposing a significant competitive economic disadvantage on Plaintiff

If the ruling of the District Court is

permitted to stand, it is unclear how Plaintiff could challenge
future tax increases by Defendant and other cities.

It does

not seem overly speculative to suggest that if Plaintiff is
forced to compete indefinitely under an artificially imposed
economic disadvantage, Plaintiff must expect to ultimately be
forced out of a market in which it should have the right to
compete.

It seems unlikely that there will ever be a more

appropriate time for Plaintiff to ask the judicial system to
help prevent such a result.
In addition, the present suit would seem to have
adequately raised the question of how far a municipality may
go in raising, directly or indirectly, the utility rates of its
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residents in order to obtain revenue.

While this may initially

appear to be a relatively painless way for the City to obtain
continual tax increases, its prolonged and repeated use raises
questions about the point where the City encroaches on those
powers committed by law to other agencies and branches of
government.
The record indicates that these important questions
should not be resolved without benefit of a trial and a full
record and, Plaintiff accordingly requests that this case be
remanded to
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

1978.
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